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Human values are desirable, trans-situational goals that vary
in importance (Schwartz, 1992). Examples include abstract
ideals such as freedom, creativity, equality, power, and free-
dom. As abstract concepts, values can be construed in diverse
ways that have implications for how we use them as self-
regulatory devices (see Maio, 2016) and as tools to justify
or explain our behaviour (e.g. Eiser, 1987; Kristiansen &
Zanna, 1988). To some extent, progress in understanding
these meaning construals has been made by models that have
distinguished among motives expressed by values (see, e.g.
Gouveia, Milfont, & Guerra, 2014; Hofstede, 1980; Inglehart,
1977; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz et al., 2001), while articulat-
ing their connections to human attitudes (Maio, Olson, &
Bernard, 2006) and actions (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004). Re-
search has also shown how value differences are related to
idiosyncratic social experiences and the sociocultural context
of each person (Gouveia et al., 2014), in addition to biological
and neurological factors (Leszkowicz, Linden, Maio, &
Ihssen, 2016; Schermer, Vernon, Maio, & Jang, 2011;
Zacharopoulos et al., 2017; Zahn et al., 2009). However, de-
spite these advances, research has not examined the crucial
question of how people conceptually map their values. As
described in the succeeding text, research has focused on
motivational representations of values and side-stepped the
issue of conceptual similarity and diversity. The present
research provides the ﬁrst direct empirical examination of
people’s conceptual representations of values using tasks that
explicitly ask about mental representations of values.
Schwartz’s theory of basic human values
The most widely cited model of values is the Theory of Basic
Human Values, developed by Schwartz (1992; Schwartz
et al., 2012). Research has demonstrated its utility across per-
sonality, social, and cross-cultural psychology. The model
postulates a universal, circular organization of human values
in a space deﬁned by motivations (see Figure 1) and has
emerged frequently as a powerful theoretical perspective that
is empirically supported with data from 80 nations around
the world (Schwartz et al., 2012).
In its original version, 57 values (e.g. equality and wisdom)
are spread across 10 value types (e.g. universalism and stimu-
lation). As shown in Figure 1, these value types are positioned
in relation to the two bipolar motivation dimensions, openness
to change versus conservation and self-enhancement versus
self-transcendence. These four quadrants of the two dimen-
sions are also known as higher order values.
A crucial element of Schwartz’s model is that values ex-
press different motivational synergies and conﬂicts. For ex-
ample, achievement values (e.g. personal success) are
adjacent to power values (e.g. dominance), because of a
similar underlying motivation to self-enhance. Conversely,
achievement is opposed to benevolence values (preserving
and enhancing the welfare of the in-group), because the un-
derlying motivations of these two sets of values (beneﬁt the
self versus beneﬁt others) are putatively in conﬂict. The
model predicts that adjacent values are more likely to be
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similar in importance than orthogonal values, which may be
less similar in importance than opposing values. However, it
is not clear that this pattern should hold for every person. For
example, for general practitioners of medicine to be success-
ful, they presumably need to value the opposing values
achievement and benevolence. Therefore, benevolence and
achievement could be next to each other in the two-
dimensional space within a sample of general practitioners.
More relevant to the present research, an unanswered ques-
tion has been whether the postulated relations are consistent
with the structure of values as conceptual categories.
Conceptual representations of human values
It is a natural human impulse, when facing something
new, to interpret it as part of a category (Goldstone, Kersten,
& Carvalho, 2012). Our cognitive system supports the classiﬁ-
cation of new objects in terms of concepts, placing them
together with previously encountered items. In other words,
we cognitively assess if the new object is similar to old ones
(Hahn & Chater, 1997). These classiﬁcations in terms of
concepts are important to provide ‘semantic knowledge’ for
words, giving them meaning and allowing the comprehension
of verbal communication (Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012). For
instance, in school, concepts help children to attribute a mean-
ing tomathematical terms (e.g. adjacent angle, acute angle, and
obtuse angle), which they organize in a way that makes sense
to them (e.g. geometry, trigonometry, and ‘maths stuff’).
A concept can be understood as a ‘mental representation
of a class or individual and deals with what is being
represented and how that information is typically used during
the categorization’ (Smith, 1989, p. 502). The process of how
the categories are represented and organized by individuals is
known as conceptual representation (Markman, 2006).
Assessing value concepts will allow us to understand
how individuals categorize values based on their knowledge,
coming from their past experience and given meaning. Also,
Schwartz’s model focuses on motivational contents in con-
sidering relations between values. Multidimensional scaling
(MDS) plots based on correlations between value importance
ratings are crucial for tapping the motivational aspect
of values, which is a key aspect of what is meant by values
(because of their motivational signiﬁcance to the self). None-
theless, similarities and differences in motivational content
among values are built on people’s understanding of the
values as concepts, but the conceptual representation of
values has not been directly examined.
Ironically, a test that is frequently used to assess concep-
tual representations has instead been used to examine the
motivational interrelations between values. Speciﬁcally, the
motivational relations have been tested by subjecting
correlations between ratings of value importance to MDS to
test Schwartz’s structure (e.g. Bilsky, Janik, & Schwartz,
2011). Using MDS analysis of value correlations (see
Figure 2 for an example), the quasi-circumplex structure of
values has been found in common space plots of data from
different samples (e.g. students, teachers, and clinicians),
for the perceived values of other people (e.g. perceived fa-
milial and societal values) and a variety of assessment tech-
niques (e.g. self-reports and response latencies; Fontaine,
Figure 1. Schwartz’s quasi-circumplex model of human values (in italic, examples of values). Adapted from Schwartz (1992). [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Mapping human values 35
© 2018 The Authors. European Journal of Personality published by
John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Personality Psychology
Eur. J. Pers. 33: 34–51 (2019)
Poortinga, Delbeke, & Schwartz, 2008; Hanel, Wolfradt,
et al., 2018; Pakizeh, Gebauer, & Maio, 2007; Schwartz,
1992, 1994; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004).
Multidimensional scaling is commonly used to analyse
people’s explicit judgments of the conceptual similarity of
objects (Borg, Groenen, & Mair, 2012), with these judg-
ments providing a spatial representation wherein item prox-
imity can be interpreted as an indicator of conceptual
similarity: Similar items are positioned more closely together
than dissimilar items (Hout, Papesh, & Goldinger, 2013).
The focus on more direct comparisons of the abstract con-
cepts enables a more direct probe of their role in human con-
cept categorization, as the values arise from abstractions or
generalizations from previous experiences. Similarity has
been widely considered as a basic psychological property
in the categorization literature, as can be seen in prototype
and exemplar theories (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Minda &
Smith, 2001; Murphy, 2004). Although these two theories
differ in how they represent categories, they both rely on
similarity. When presented with a putative new instance of
a category, the similarity of that instance to the relevant rep-
resentations (e.g. a single prototype and a set of examples) is
used as a basis for assigning that instance to a category
(Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Minda & Smith, 2001; Murphy,
2004). Thus, when presenting different pairs of value con-
cepts to individuals, people are able to make categorizations
based on their understanding of these values.
The results of people’s conceptual comparisons of values
may differ from the motivational interrelations between
values. For instance, some individuals might think of wealth,
a self-enhancement value, as similar to self-transcendence
values (e.g. helpfulness and broadmindedness) because of
past experiences that pair the values continuously (e.g. earn-
ing money to save lives as a doctor and saving money to
work abroad as a volunteer), even though they might recog-
nize conﬂicting motives between these values in many
circumstances (e.g. decisions about whether to donate money
to a beggar and spending time to help another with
coursework). Therefore, values that have different
underlying motives could nevertheless be similar and thus
correspond to a different spatial arrangement.
Assessing similarities affords a closer look at the concep-
tual representations of the meaning of the values, without
scrutiny of the aforementioned motives. This analysis can
be important for theory development, as was recently
illustrated by Koch, Imhoff, Dotsch, Unkelbach, and Alves
(2016). These investigators applied MDS to similarity
judgments in the context of Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu’s
(2002) highly inﬂuential model of stereotype content and
found that the model can be improved with an added dimen-
sion. This ability to tap meaning is vital for models of values
because of the abstract nature of value concepts. Many
theories of values, including Schwartz’s perspective, recog-
nize the importance of diverse affective, cognitive, and
behavioural components of values (see also Rokeach,
1973), which are also directly tied to speciﬁc contexts and
actions that people use in mental representations of values
(Maio, 2010). A number of experiments have shown that
the concrete content that people provide for values makes a
difference in how values relate to subsequent action (e.g.
Maio, Hahn, Frost, & Cheung, 2009; Maio, Olson, Allen,
& Bernard, 2001). Therefore, it is possible that the relations
between values as inferred from motive endorsement may
be different from those inferred from other value-concept
assessments, such as similarity ratings. For example, some
values might be more conceptually related to opposing or
adjacent value types, depending on individuals’ mental rep-
resentations. Indeed, prior research by Pakizeh et al. (2007)
noted empirical differences between conceptual similarity
and similarities in value importance judgments. These
researchers found only a modest association between partic-
ipants’ judgments of the semantic similarity of pairs of
values and discrepancies in value importance (r = 0.26,
p < 0.001). However, Pakizeh et al. did not attempt to map
conceptual representations of values using the similarity
judgments and test whether the circular structure of values
held in these representations.
Fortunately, the use of similarity and categorization judg-
ments in MDS is well-suited to revealing these conceptual
representations with relatively high precision. This precision
arises because the MDS matrix provides similarities judg-
ments for all pairs of items, generating a spatial map of
values based on a more direct task. This approach allows a
within-subject assessment of the value space, because
participants directly compare the similarities between values.
In contrast to reliance on between-subject covariance in
value importance judgments, this approach generates a more
valid plane because each participant provides more data,
explicitly considering the relations of each item (e.g. value)
to all other items, rather than merely using a single set of
between-participant correlations to furnish the proximity data.
Prior research supports the utility of this within-person
approach. Across 17 European countries, Gollan and Witte
(2014) replicated the quasi-circumplex structure. The pro-
posed structure was also found within-persons across coun-
tries (e.g. the UK, the USA, and Iran) and across value
measures (e.g. Schwartz values survey and portrait values
questionnaire; Borg, Bardi, & Schwartz, 2017). However,
Figure 2. An example of multidimensional scaling applied to human values
(Bilsky et al., 2011). Each number indicates the positions of the values in
their respective value type. [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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these studies relied on importance ratings to assess the moti-
vational structure of Schwartz’s model, while our studies as-
sess the conceptual similarities through direct comparisons.
The present research
Previous research has assessed the quasi-circumplex structure
of Schwartz model in the UK and in Brazil with scales that
relied on importance ratings. In the UK, Bilsky et al. (2011)
found support for the quasi-circumplex structure across three
representative samples. In Brazil, the structure was also
replicated (Sambiase, Teixeira, Bilsky, Felix, & Domenico,
2010; Tamayo & Porto, 2009; Tamayo & Schwartz, 1993),
although some minor deviations emerged. For example, some
value types merged (e.g. hedonism and stimulation, Tamayo
& Schwartz, 1993; stimulation and self-direction, Sambiase
et al., 2010) or swapped positions (e.g. stimulation and
benevolence; Tamayo & Porto, 2009). Consistently, the value
types universalism and benevolence tended to occupy the
same region across studies in Brazil. Fontaine et al. (2008)
point to several possible explanations for deviations in values
structure, including sample differences (e.g. general popula-
tion and student sample), the meaning attributed to values
cross-culturally, and national development.
Unlike past research using value correlations, the aim of
our research was to provide a direct analysis of conceptual
representations of values by applying MDS analyses (Studies
1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7) and common space plots (Study 5) to
different categorization tasks. These methods were applied
to similarity judgments of values through seven studies and
nine samples across two countries (seven samples from the
UK and two from Brazil). Furthermore, we assessed all three
conceptual levels in Schwartz’s model of values. That is, we
asked participants to make comparisons involving speciﬁc
values, value types, and value dimensions (cf. Figure 1). In
Study 1, participants judged the similarity between speciﬁc
values from Schwartz’s model. In Study 2, participants
judged the similarities of the 10 value types, and, in Study
3, participants were asked to compare all 57 values from
Schwartz’s theory to the 10 value types. In Study 4, partici-
pants compared how similar the value items are to the four
higher order values. Study 5 elicited judgments of the mean-
ing of values by asking participants to position the human
values along Schwartz’s two motivational dimensions. To
provide an even more diverse assessment, Studies 6 and 7
assessed the structure of all value items with a pile sorting
task and a spatial arrangement task. Together, these methods
provided the ﬁrst assessment of the structure of values based
on their perceived similarities.
Methodologically, we assessed the ﬁt between the data
from experiment and the locations in Schwartz’s model
using a Procrustean superimposing approach (Peres-Neto &
Jackson, 2001). This method can be applied to the outcome
of an MDS, such as the axes of spatial conﬁguration, but also
on an individual level, as we demonstrate in Study 7. Study 1
describes how this analysis works.
The combined sample size across all nine samples is 1086
participants. Our research questions were of an exploratory
nature. All data, statistical code, instructions, tasks, and
Online Supplementary Material (OSM) are available through
the link https://goo.gl/Vutc5K. In the OSM, you can also ﬁnd
task examples, Sheppard Plots, Stress-per-point tables, and
Procrustes rotation ﬁgures for Study 7.
STUDY 1
The purpose of this study was to use similarity judgments be-
tween values to derive an MDS spatial arrangement describ-
ing conceptual representations of the values. Speciﬁcally,
we aimed to test whether our approach would reproduce the
quasi-circumplex structure, using a subset of all 57 values in
Schwartz’s model. Comparing all 57 values from Schwartz’s
model would yield 1596 comparisons, which would require a
long period of time, leading to boredom or loss of concentra-
tion. Consequently, our ﬁrst study asked participants to
consider only 16 values, which were selected as being well-
spaced among the quadrants from Schwartz’s (1992) theory.
The relations of between all values in Schwartz’s model were
investigated using different methods in Studies 6 and 7.
Method
Participants
Participants were 109 psychology students (n = 93 women;
n = 16 men; Mage = 19.78; SD = 3.05), who took part in
exchange for course credit.
Materials and procedure
Participants were asked to rate the similarity of 16 values
(e.g. social order), across the four higher-order value quad-
rants in Schwartz’s model, using items from the Schwartz
Value Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992). Speciﬁcally, they were
presented with one value and then asked to rate how similar
they personally thought this value was to a list of other
values. This rating was made using a sliding scale from 0
(completely different) to 100 (extremely similar) to make
120 comparisons between values. They were instructed to
click on the slider and move it towards the rating that best de-
scribed the similarity between the pair of values. Participants
began by comparing one value with the other 15 values on
one screen, and then a new screen appeared. The new screen
asked participants to compare another of the 15 values with
the other 14 values, and so on until just two values were re-
maining for comparison, with a total of 120 comparisons be-
tween values. Value items were presented in alphabetical
order (ambition, equality, exciting life, and so on...). To see
the full instructions and the complete tasks, for this and the
next studies, please access https://goo.gl/Vutc5K.
The values in the self-enhancement quadrant were
wealth, ambition, intelligent, and preserving my public im-
age; the values in the self-transcendence quadrant were social
justice, helpful, and equality; the values in the conservation
quadrant were obedient, respect for tradition, national secu-
rity, and social order; the values in the openness to change
quadrant were independent, self-respect, exciting life, plea-
sure, and freedom.
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Results and discussion
Multidimensional scaling methodology
The means of all 120 comparisons were calculated, creating a
half-matrix data set, also known as a triangular matrix. Next,
an ordinal MDS on the half-matrix was performed using the
PROXSCAL algorithm. This algorithm creates a geometric
representation of the data, respecting the proximity of the
items (Hout et al., 2013). The Torgerson conﬁguration was
selected as the initial conﬁguration. This conﬁguration
is also known as classical MDS and aims to create a two-
dimensional representation of high-dimensional data
(Brandes & Pich, 2007). Stress-I was used to indicate the
model’s goodness of ﬁt, considering the difference between
the input proximities and output distances in the Cartesian
plane (Jaworska & Chupetlovska-Anastasova, 2009). Lower
values indicate a better model ﬁt. In all of our studies using
MDS, we employed the cut-off values proposed by Sturrock
and Rocha (2000); these cut-offs consider the number of
points and dimensions presented in the analyses. For this
study, with 16 values in two dimensions, a Stress-I lower
than 0.24 is recommended. Therefore, our results indicate a
good model ﬁt using this criterion (Stress-I = 0.14; cf.
Figure 3). We also tested the stress-per-point of the model
—the extent to which each one of the values contributes to
the total stress. That is, we considered the normalized raw
stress (
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
n:r:s
p
= Stress-I) scores. In this study, self-respect
and wealth were the values with higher individually stress.
The full stress-per-point table for this and further studies
are available on the OSM (https://goo.gl/Vutc5K).
However, these indices indicate only how well the data
can be characterized in a two-dimensional space and not
whether the data are consistent with the speciﬁc two-
dimensional space in Schwartz’s proposed structure. The
data could ﬁt into a two-dimensional space with values
positioned very differently from Schwartz’s model. To assess
this ﬁt to Schwartz’s model, we used Procrustes analysis
(‘Protest’; Peres-Neto & Jackson, 2001), which tests the
degree to which two sets of points align. Speciﬁcally, Protest
‘compares two ordinations using symmetric Procrustes anal-
ysis’ (Oksanen, 2015) by minimizing the sum-of-squared dif-
ferences through rescaling the conﬁgurations to a common
size, mirror reﬂecting (if necessary), and rotating (Peres-Neto
& Jackson, 2001). Protest is therefore also known as an
analysis of congruence (Oksanen, 2015).
To perform the analysis, we needed two conﬁgurations
whose congruence we assessed through superimposition.
The data were one conﬁguration, and hypothetical coordi-
nates for Schwartz’s (1992) model were the other conﬁgura-
tion. We speciﬁed the coordinates of Schwartz’s model by
approximating them through visual inspections to the MDS
output coordinates from Schwartz (1992). For example, the
four self-enhancement values were expected to be on x
(axis) = 0 and y (axis) = 0.5, and the four conservation values
on x = 0.5, and y = 0, as shown in Figure 3. For a better
visualization, we also used the convex hull (the dashed lines
connecting the values) in Figure 3, which provides the
smallest convex set of values to each higher order value. This
method was also applied to the spatial planes derived in the
other studies we conducted. Note that it is not necessary to
match the starting coordinates to the model ﬁt, because the
Protest function rotates and mirror reﬂects the coordinates
if necessary, but some starting conﬁgurations that are in line
with Schwartz’s model are needed. Further, we focused on ﬁt
Figure 3. Structure based on similarity judgments between value items (Study 1). Self-enhancement (ﬁlled diamonds), self-transcendence (squares), openness
to change (hollow diamonds), and conservation (triangles). [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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to the four higher order values rather than breaking the anal-
ysis down to the 10 value types because we were only inter-
ested in a ﬁt to the overall model rather than small deviations
within each value type.
Data were analysed with the R package ‘vegan’ (version
2.5–1; Oksanen et al., 2018), which has a Protest function
based on Peres-Neto and Jackson (2001). The Protest returns
a correlation-like effect size and estimates its statistical sig-
niﬁcance. Although the correlation-like effect size, which is
called ‘correlation in a symmetric Procrustes rotation’, is of-
ten labelled as r (e.g. Oksanen, 2015), we will refer to it as rm
to avoid confusion with the Pearson’s correlation coefﬁcient
r. Larger correlations imply a better ﬁt, and signiﬁcant results
indicate a match between the two sets of points. Procrustes
rotation assumes that two different conﬁgurations with the
same number of points are being compared. In our case,
however, these points are from different levels: Our data
are from the value item level, while the hypothetical conﬁg-
urations use coordinates from the four higher order values.
This difference regarding the nature of the points means that
we did not expect to ﬁnd a perfect ﬁt, because the values
items of one higher order value were not all expected to be
in the same position. For Study 1, the ﬁt of the data to the
model was signiﬁcant: rm = 0.86, p ≤ 0.001.
The conceptual spatial arrangement of human values from
the similarity judgment task (Figure 3) resembled the one
found in Schwartz’s (1992) analysis of value importance rat-
ings. The values that were predicted to be on opposing sides
of the value circle were in opposition in all cases, and most
of the values serving related motives appeared near each other
in the plots. Overall, then, the application of MDS to the sim-
ilarity ratings revealed a conceptual representation matching
the motivational patterns elucidated in Schwartz’s model.
Nonetheless, a few exceptions were noted. First, if we
compare the distribution displayed in Figure 1 to the one from
Schwartz (1992) studies, it can be noticed that some values
changed position with other values that belong to the same
higher order value type, resulting in minor deviations: Pleasure
(a hedonism value) switched places with independent and self-
respect (self-direction values). In addition, there was an
alteration in adjacent motivational value types: The security
values changed position with tradition\conformity. Again, this
change occurred in the same higher order values. Thus, the
conceptual map does not differ substantially from the motiva-
tional patterns in Schwartz’s model at the level of higher order
values. This conclusion is further assessed in Studies 6 and 7
using different methods. In the next study, we aim to check
these patterns at the level of lower order value types.
STUDY 2
The aim of Study 2 was to evaluate conceptual representa-
tions of values using similarity judgments between each of
the 10 value types in Schwartz’s (1992) model (e.g., stimula-
tion, benevolence). That is, participants were asked to
compare the value types, rather than individual value items,
resulting in a total of 45 comparisons between the 10 value
types. This was a smaller set of comparisons than in Study
1, but it enabled examination of the conceptual representa-
tion of values at the level of value type, instead of focusing
only on a small number of speciﬁc values in each type. This
study also evaluated culturally distinct samples, one in the
UK and the other in Brazil.
Method
Participants
British participants included individuals from a community
research panel who took part in exchange for a prize draw
and undergraduate psychology students who took part for
course credit. They responded to an Instructional Manipula-
tion Check (IMC; Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko,
2009), which a task created to see if the participants spend
time reading instructions, and two ‘test items’ (e.g. ‘please,
rate everything “extremely” ’) within the study. In total, 11
participants failed (four students and seven from general pop-
ulation) the IMC twice and were excluded1 from the analysis,
leaving 111 participants in the sample (n = 84 women; n = 27
men), with a mean age of 23.54 (SD = 8.99). Brazilian partic-
ipants were recruited from the general population, with nine
of them failing the IMC twice and/or both test items,
resulting in a ﬁnal sample of 69 (n = 34 women; n = 34
men; 1 missing; Mage = 32.15, SD = 13.39).
Materials and procedure
In this task, participants were instructed to rate the similari-
ties between the 10 value types (e.g. benevolence and
achievement) taken from Schwartz’s (1992). Speciﬁcally,
they rated how similar they personally thought two value
types were, using a slider scale, ranging from 0 (not at all)
to 100 (extremely). One pair was presented at a time and in
a random order. Participants rated similarity by clicking on
the slider and move it towards the rating that best indicated
their opinion regarding the similarity of the items. All the
value types were followed by a short deﬁnition [e.g. Univer-
salism (Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protec-
tion for the welfare of all people and for nature)], in order to
make all value types clear to participants.
Results and discussion
As in Study 1, two half-matrix data sets containing the means
of all comparisons were created. Again, ordinal MDSs were
performed on each half-matrix, using the PROXSCAL
algorithm with Torgerson conﬁguration. With 10 values, a
Stress lower than 0.13 is recommended (Sturrock & Rocha,
2000). Results indicated a good ﬁt in both samples (UK,
Stress-I = 0.04, rm = 0.89, p ≤ 0.001; BR, Stress-I = 0.05,
rm = 0.92, p ≤ 0.001). The values types that contributed most
to the model stress were conformity and security in the UK
and security and hedonism in Brazil.
As can be seen in Figure 4, some small deviations were
noted. For instance, security positioned adjacent to power,
instead of proximal to self-transcendence value types. These
1These exclusions did not affect the ﬁndings, neither in this study or the
others.
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deviations do not affect the overall structure, with the value
types from the same higher order value positioned broadly
in the same space (e.g. self-transcendence values: universal-
ism and benevolence). Also, the opposing higher order
values were again in opposite positions (self-enhancement
\self-transcendence and conservation\openness to change),
supporting Schwartz’s model. Thus, the two-dimensional
arrangement retained the separation and ordering of the
higher order value types (Bilsky et al., 2011). In the next
study, we mixed the levels of abstraction in values
considered in Studies 1 and 2, performing direct similarity
judgments tasks between value items and value types.
STUDY 3
The prior studies used a limited number of value compari-
sons (up to 120) per participant to prevent participant fatigue.
Study 3 examined similarity judgments between all 57 values
and the 10 value types. This required 570 comparisons,
which is far in excess of the number of comparisons made
in the prior studies. Thus, to attenuate participant fatigue,
these comparisons were divided into two blocks, with each
participant responding to half of the randomly selected items,
resulting in a total of 285 comparisons. The answers were
further aggregated across participants, forming a single
matrix based on the means between each pair of items.
Method
Participants
Participants were 181 psychology students, who took part in
exchange for course credits. Participants answered the IMC
(Oppenheimer et al., 2009) and ﬁve ‘test items’ (e.g. ‘please,
rate everything extremely’), which were added in a random
location among the other items. Participants who failed the
IMC twice and/or two or more test items were excluded from
the analyses. In total, 25 participants were excluded from the
analyses. The remaining sample contained 156 participants
(n = 144 women; n = 12 men), and the sample’s mean age
was 19.59 years (SD = 2.38).
Materials and procedure
Participants were asked to rate the similarity between each of
the 57 human values (e.g. equality and freedom) and the 10
value types (e.g. stimulation and conformity) from
Schwartz’s (1992) theory. In this study, participants were
presented with all 57 values, one by one, and compared each
one to ﬁve randomly selected value types. Participants rated
the similarity of each pair using a slider scale, ranging from 0
(not at all) to 100 (extremely). They moved a slider towards
the score to which best represents the extent that they person-
ally think each pair is similar.
Results and discussion
First, the means of all comparisons were calculated, creating
a full matrix (value items × value types). Next, an ordinal
MDS (PROXSCAL) was performed, using the Torgerson
conﬁguration. The resulting Stress-I of 0.10 indicated a good
model ﬁt (recommended lower than 0.37, for 57 objects;
Sturrock & Rocha, 2000). Privacy and sense of belonging
contributed most to the stress. Protest indicated a good ﬁt
to Schwartz model: rm = 0.80, p ≤ 0.001. Figure 5 shows
the spatial arrangement of the human values according to
Figure 4. Value types along two dimensions (Study 2). Green diamonds represent our UK sample; blue squares represent our Brazilian sample; grey circles
represent value type positions expected from Schwartz’s model. [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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their similarities to the value types. Overall, there were high
similarities between the value items and their expected or
adjacent value types. As in the prior studies, the circular ar-
rangement still retained the correct separation and ordering
of the higher order value types (Bilsky et al., 2011).
Only three of the 57 values were positioned in unex-
pected places: healthy, privacy, and responsible. In previous
research, these values also emerged in inconsistent positions
(e.g. Schwartz et al., 2012; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). For
example, healthy can be often found next to hedonism,
achievement, self-direction, and, as in this case, benevolence
(Schwartz, 1992).
STUDY 4
The results to this point yielded support for a model of
values’ semantic meaning that closely matches Schwartz’s
model. To further probe the reliability of this mapping, Study
4 asked participants to rate the similarities between
Schwartz’s (1992) 57 values and the four higher order
values. As in Study 3, we attempted to attenuate participant
fatigue by presenting them with a randomly chosen subsam-
ple composed of 30 of the 57 human values.
Method
Participants
Participants were 126 individuals who were recruited online
through Proliﬁc Academic. However, 19 of these participants
failed the IMC (Oppenheimer et al., 2009) twice and/or three
test items, which were added in random parts of the main
task. The remaining sample contained 107 participants
(n = 57 women; n = 50 men), with a mean age of 37.11 years
(SD = 12.56).
Materials and procedure
Participants were instructed to rate the similarities between
Schwartz’s human values (e.g. authority and loyal) and the
four higher order values (e.g. self-enhancement and conser-
vation). Participants were presented with one main value on
the top of the screen and then asked to rate the extent to
which this value is similar to each of the four higher order
values, using a slider scale from 0 (not at all) to 100 (ex-
tremely). Participants clicked and moved the slider towards
the response option that best indicated their personal answer
regarding the similarity of each pair.
Results and discussion
The matrix was created using the means from all value com-
parisons (value items × higher order values). Once again, an
ordinal MDS (PROXSCAL; Torgerson conﬁguration) indi-
cated good model ﬁt (Stress-I = 0.05; recommended lower
than 0.37; Sturrock & Rocha, 2000). Accepting my portion
in life and sense of belonging contributed most to the total
stress. The ﬁnal spatial arrangement can be seen in
Figure 6. Protest analysis indicated a good ﬁt to Schwartz’s
model, rm = 0.68, p ≤ 0.001.
Figure 5. Value positions according to their similarities to the value types (Study 3). [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Notwithstanding this replication, the distribution indi-
cates that openness and self-enhancement values exhibited
better ﬁt to their respective higher order values, being more
clustered together, whereas self-transcendence and conserva-
tion values were more widely separated in the spatial plane.
One possible explanation for these ﬁndings was provided in
the Schwartz et al. (2012) reﬁned theory, in which the
authors divided the 10 value types of the original model into
19 value types. Both self-transcendence and conservation
were divided into more subcategories than the other two
higher order values, indicating higher diversity. Therefore,
their spread of positions in our results might indicate more
diverse concepts in these higher order values.
STUDY 5
Study 5 asked participants to use the dimensions from
Schwartz’s theory to plot the values. Unlike the prior studies,
this method did not ask participants to rate similarities
between items but rather to pin their location onto the self-
enhancement versus self-transcendence and the openness
versus conservation dimensions. If a value is placed closer
to one end in either or both dimensions, this end would be
considered more characteristic or similar to the value. This
method enabled us to examine the conceptual map when par-
ticipants think about the dimensions themselves. The method
was useful because the dimensions are important core fea-
tures of the model, as it relies on a two-dimensional space
that implicitly contrast motives. In addition, the method is
more direct insofar as it plots participants’ responses
without any further transformation, unlike MDS. Study 5
also probed whether the ﬁndings can be replicated in Brazil.
Method
Participants
In the UK, participants were 180 psychology students, who
took part for course credit. Thirteen participants were ex-
cluded from the analyses: participants who failed the IMC
(Oppenheimer et al., 2009) twice and/or two or more of four
test items (e.g. ‘please, select the ﬁrst option in the scale’)
that were added in random parts of the study. The remaining
sample contained 167 participants (n = 150 women; n = 17
men), and the mean age was 19.82 (SD = 3.12). In Brazil,
participants were 94 individuals from the general population.
Those who failed the IMC twice and/or the test items were
excluded from the analysis. The remaining sample included
86 Brazilians (n = 40 women; n = 46 men), and the mean
age was 27.21 (SD = 9.08).
Materials and procedure
Participants read a brief summary of Schwartz’s (1992) the-
ory to ensure that they understood the dimensions described
in the model. Next, they were instructed to position the hu-
man values (e.g. an exciting life) on each dimension of
Schwartz’s model (e.g. self-enhancement versus self-
transcendence), based on their personal understanding of
Figure 6. Value positions according to their similarities to the value types (Study 4). [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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these dimensions. Participants used a 9-point bipolar scale,
with the opposing higher order value domains identiﬁed at
each end. Values placed closer to one end of the dimension
should be more representative of that end, while values
placed in the middle should share information from both
ends. The values were presented one at a time.
Results and discussion
In this study, the spatial arrangement was speciﬁed directly
from the means of the values for both dimensions, with
self-enhancement versus self-transcendence as the X axis
and openness to change versus conservation as the Y axis.
This method allowed us to check the coordinates directly in
the respective quadrants without needing an optimization
function. Self-enhancement values should be located in one
half of the X axis, while self-transcendence values should
be located in the other half. Similarly, openness to change
values should be located in one half of the Y axis, while con-
servation values should be located in the other half. Due to the
nature of this task, we expected the values to be positioned
in their half of their respective axes, but not necessarily in
speciﬁc quadrants—which visually would not represent
the quasi-circumplex structure. For example, some self-
enhancement values may be more related to values of
openness to change than to conservation, causing these self-
enhancement values to fall outside of their putative quadrant.
United Kingdom
We present the ﬁndings for the UK and Brazil separately
because they were somewhat different. In the UK, the ﬁt
was acceptable, rm = 0.73, p ≤ 0.001. However, as noted in
Study 1, the rm does not replace a qualitative assessment of
the common space plot, as is commonly used in the literature
(e.g. Bilsky et al., 2011; Schwartz, 1992). Figure 7 shows
all 57 human values from Schwartz’s (1992) theory
positioned along the two dimensions in the model. Eight
(ST: inner harmony, meaning in life, mature love, a spiritual
life, wisdom, true friendship; CO: sense of belonging; OP:
privacy) of the 57 values were positioned in the opposite half
of the higher order value dimension. Of importance, in
Schwartz and Sagiv’s (1995) research assessing value
structure cross-culturally, six of these eight values were
highlighted as presenting an inconsistent position across the
spatial maps. Therefore, some of the deviations were repli-
cated in our study.
Of interest, six of the eight shifts in location occurred
for self-transcendence values. One shift arose for a
conservation value, and one for an openness to change
value. Although some of these eight exceptions were near
the middle of the scale (sense of belonging, true friendship,
a spiritual life, privacy), indicating only small deviations,
many of the self-transcendence values were much
further from their predicted side of the dimension. This
ﬁnding may indicate more conceptual variability in self-
transcendence values.
Brazil
Once again, the ﬁt was acceptable, rm = 0.72, p ≤ 0.001. As
Figure 8 reveals, nine (ST: inner harmony, meaning in life;
CO: healthy, sense of belonging, humble, reciprocation of
favors, politeness; OP: privacy, self-respect) of the 57
values were positioned in the opposite of the predicted side
of the higher order value dimension. Five of these values
were also considered inconsistent in Schwartz and Sagiv’s
(1995) cross-cultural research. Four of the nine
mispositioned values were also misplaced in the British
sample (sense of belonging, inner harmony, meaning in life,
and privacy).
Overall, the ﬁndings revealed clusters of the four higher
order values, but with some of their items spread to unex-
pected positions in the UK and Brazil. As a result, the oppo-
sitions between the higher order values were not clearly
supported, perhaps because participants positioned the
Figure 7. Values placed along Schwartz’s value dimensions (UK; Study 5). [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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values along both dimensions simultaneously and had there-
fore potentially made a trade-off when they saw a value
ﬁtting equally well to both opposing higher order value
types. For example, the value pleasure (openness to change
value) might be considered by some participants to be more
closely related to self-enhancement, while for others, it was
more closely related to self-transcendence (e.g. as some
might conceptualise pleasure as something personal, whereas
as others might see it as something social). Thus, the location
depends of their individual knowledge and interpretation of
the values and the value dimensions, which might differ
when making the associations.
STUDY 6
In Study 6, we investigated the structure of all 57 values
(Schwartz, 1992) with Pile Sorting, a method that has not
been used before in value research. Pile Sorting (also known
as card sorting) is a powerful technique to assess relations be-
tween items (Yeh et al., 2014). In our study, participants
sorted the values into a number of piles\groups chosen by
each participant individually, based on how similar they
judged the values to be. Through the piles\groups, a dis-
tance\proximity matrix can be created, allowing us to per-
form an MDS to assess the structure of conceptual relations
between values.
Method
Participants
Participants were 129 individuals (Mage = 37.85; SD = 12.80),
who were recruited online from Great Britain through
Proliﬁc Academic (n = 64 women; n = 56 men; 9
missing). All participants passed the IMC (Oppenheimer
et al., 2009).
Materials and procedure
Participants were presented a list of all 57 values (e.g.
responsible and moderate) from Schwartz’s (1992) value
model and were asked to arrange these values into categories,
based on how similar they personally think the values are.
Participants used a drag-and-drop method, freely creating
as many groups\piles as they saw ﬁt to place the values, in
a way that made most sense to them. Participants were asked
to place the values that they judged to be more similar in the
same group\pile, and they could also move values between
groups, if necessary. This task was completed through the
website https://www.usabilitest.com/.
Results and discussion
In the ﬁrst step of the analysis, a matrix was created based
on how many times the values were grouped\piled together
by the participants. This matrix was composed of 57 rows
and columns, representing each combination of values. For
instance, if the values freedom and obedient were placed
into different groups\piles by one participant, one point
would be added to the total score of this combination into
the matrix. If they were placed together, no point would be
added. In sum, lower scores indicate higher similarities (or
a higher number of times placed together). Based on this
similarity matrix, an interval MDS (PROXSCAL; Torgerson
conﬁguration) was performed. Results indicated a moder-
ately good model ﬁt (Stress-I = 0.27; recommended lower
than 0.37; Sturrock & Rocha, 2000). Accepting my portion
in life and reciprocation of favors contributed most to the to-
tal stress. Protest revealed a relatively poor ﬁt rm = 0.49,
p ≤ 0.001, because openness and self-enhancement values
and conservation and self-transcendence values were mixed.
The ﬁnal spatial arrangement of values can be seen in
Figure 9.
Figure 8. Values placed along Schwartz’s value dimensions (BR; Study 5). [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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This study was the ﬁrst to assess the structure of all 57
values simultaneously using a method that has not been used
previously in values research. Instead of using direct similar-
ity judgments between all 57 values, we asked participants to
group\pile the values based on their perception of how simi-
lar the values are. The MDS distribution indicates an interest-
ing structure. Instead of the two dimensions spread across the
four quadrants, values were grouped into a single wide di-
mension. Self-transcendence and conservation values were
positioned together into one end, with self-enhancement
and openness to change values in the other. Although the
ﬁndings support Schwartz’s model less than the previous
studies, the grouping of values is still meaningful: Self-
transcendence and conservation have a social focus, relating
to how individuals socially relate to and affect others; self-
enhancement and openness to change have a more personal
focus, regulating how the individuals express their personal
interests and characteristics (e.g. Schwartz et al., 2012).
One possible explanation for this clustering in two
groups is the Luster-Splitter Problem (Weller & Romney,
1988). This is a problem (or ﬁnding, to phrase it more neutral)
commonly seen in a free pile sorting method, where partici-
pants are asked to create as many piles as they want, as long
as the groups have more than one item. Some participants cre-
ate just a few groups\piles, while others create many. This
may lead to lower complexity in the ﬁnal model, resulting
in few conceptual distinctions than seen with other methods.
STUDY 7
In Study 7, we investigated the structure of all 57 values
(Schwartz, 1992) with the spatial arrangement method
(SpAM), another method that has not been used before in
value research. Participants were asked to arrange the values
in a spatial plane using a technique developed by Goldstone
(1994) to measure similarity between items. This efﬁcient
technique was also used in previous social psychological
research, where it provided innovative results suggesting as
a substantial modiﬁcation of the stereotype content model
(Koch, Imhoff, et al., 2016). The method has been used in
several other studies (Koch, Alves, Kniger, & Unkelbach,
2016; Koch, Kervyn, Kervyn, & Imhoff, in press; Lammers,
Koch, Conway, & Brandt, in press). In addition, Study 7
included value importance ratings. These ratings enabled
me to test the motivational structure of values in the same
sample as used to test the conceptual structure of values.
In this manner, we could do a within-study comparison of
the ﬁndings to ensure that any differences between the
models are not due to between-study differences in samples.
Method
Participants
Participants were 154 individuals recruited online through
Proliﬁc Academic. Two of them were excluded because they
failed the IMC (Oppenheimer et al., 2009) and/or test items,
resulting in a total of 152 participants (Mage = 37.93;
SD = 11.15; n = 105 women; n = 47 men), mostly from Great
Britain (n = 146).
Materials and procedure
Participants were instructed to arrange the 57 values (e.g.
honest and inﬂuential) of Schwartz’s (1992) model based
on their similarities in a two-dimensional space. The values
Figure 9. Value positions according to value similarities (Study 6). [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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were positioned together in the centre of an otherwise black
screen. The participants’ task was to spatially arrange the
values using drag and drop. Speciﬁcally, the task was to draw
a value map where a greater proximity would indicate a
greater similarity and greater distance would show greater
dissimilarity, in a way that makes most sense to the partici-
pants. Thus, participants drew their own value model in a
two-dimensional space. All values had to be moved at least
once to ﬁnish the task. A screenshot of the starting screen
can be found online (https://goo.gl/Vutc5K).
Participants also completed the SVS (Schwartz, 1992),
containing all 57 value items from Schwartz’s theory. Partic-
ipants rated the importance of each value using a 9-point
scale (1 = opposed to my values; 0 = not important; 3 = im-
portant; 6 = very important; 7 = of supreme importance).
Results and discussion
Spatial arrangement
To analyse the data, we followed the Koch, Imhoff, et al.
(2016) script for SpAM. Several steps were necessary before
proceeding to the MDS. First, the Euclidian distance between
the values was calculated—that is, the distance between all
the pairs of stimuli was considered. As participants have dif-
ferent screen resolutions, we also divided pairwise sorting
distance by the greatest possible distance (the diagonal of
the screen). Thus, this division relates actual distance to
available distance to account for screen size varying between
participants. Then, we averaged sorting distance separately
for each stimulus pair across all participants who sorted that
pair, resulting in an N*N (i.e. stimuli) matrix that we then
subjected to MDS. The results indicated a good model ﬁt
(Stress-I = 0.20; recommended lower than 0.37; Sturrock &
Rocha, 2000) and an acceptable Protest value, rm = 0.71,
p ≤ 0.001. The ﬁnal structure can be seen in Figure 10.
The spatial structure (Figure 11) resembled the quasi-
circumplex structure from Schwartz’s (1992) model: The
opposing positions of the two dimensions emerged clearly
across the four quadrants. However, openness to change
values were more clustered, while conservation values were
more spread across the spatial map, merging partly with
self-transcendence values. This mix might have occurred
due to the social focus in these values, as happened in Study 6.
Finally, we assessed the structure for each participant in-
dividually. For 90 out of the 152 participants (59.21%), the
Protest was signiﬁcant; that is, the majority of participants
created Schwartz’s structure at least partly. Examples for a
very good, a medium (i.e. just about signiﬁcant), and a very
poor ﬁt can be found in Data S1. Following Gollan and Witte
(2014), who found that ‘persons whose value proﬁles show a
poor ﬁt to the model are (a) younger than the majority and (b)
endorse values that are usually considered less important’
(p. 1), we also tested for moderators. Speciﬁcally, we corre-
lated the model ﬁt index rm with the 10 value types as mea-
sured by the SVS, age, gender, and level of education. Of
these correlates, only education signiﬁcantly predicted model
ﬁt, r(150) = 0.28, p < 0.001. Higher educated participants
were more likely to arrange the values in a manner that
followed Schwartz’s structure. This interesting ﬁnding may
reﬂect effects of education on conceptual sophistication with
values, or it may reﬂect effects of greater verbal ability on
comprehension. The latter speculation is in line with the
reasons for Schwartz’s development of the Portrait Values
Questionnaire (PVQ) (Schwartz et al., 2001), an alternative
and more comprehensible measure of values as compared
with the SVS (Schwartz, 1992). Use of the PVQ has repli-
cated the proposed structure better in less developed (and
Figure 10. Value positions according to value similarities (Study 7). [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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hence less educated in a Western sense) countries (Schwartz
et al., 2001). Thus, it is possible that this effect of education
would be removed if the spatial arrangement task were
applied to PVQ items instead of SVS items.
Schwartz Value Survey
The spatial arrangement was also assessed using value
importance ratings as typically used in prior research. We
followed the syntax provided by Bilsky et al. (2011), in
which the MDS (PROXSCAL) is performed using a matrix
of correlations between the value items, together with a
restrictions ﬁle. Results indicated a good model ﬁt
(Stress-I = 0.22; recommended lower than 0.37; Sturrock &
Rocha, 2000). Its distribution can be seen in Figure 11.
Finally, we assessed the ﬁt between the similarity judgments
and importance ratings distributions, with results showing
good correspondence (rm = 0.74, p ≤ 0.001). This Procrustes
plot can be seen in Data S1. These ﬁndings provide the ﬁrst
direct empirical evidence for correspondence between indi-
viduals’ conceptual mapping of values and their motivational
structuring of their interrelations.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This research provided the ﬁrst direct examination of the
conceptual representation of values using similarity judg-
ments using a diverse range of methods. We asked partici-
pants to judge the similarity between value items, value
types, and value dimensions through direct comparisons
(Studies 1–4), to position the values among the two dimen-
sions using a bipolar scale (Study 5), and to provide similar-
ity judgments of all 57 values through two different methods
—pile sorting (Study 6) and spatial arrangement (Study 7).
Additionally, in Study 7, we found that 59% of the partici-
pants replicated Schwartz’s structure when asked to arrange
the values based on their similarities, similar to previous re-
search that used importance ratings (Borg et al., 2017; Gollan
& Witte, 2014).
It was an empirical question whether these new tasks
would generate the same circular structure as previously
yielded by correlations between value importance given the
difference in theoretical basis between the two. Our tasks
asked for judgments of concepts, which should be less
inﬂuenced by social desirability than personal value impor-
tance ratings. Despite these differences, the results of our
concept-focused tasks generally resembled the results of the
motivation-focused tasks (e.g. Bilsky et al., 2011; Schwartz,
1992). When assessing how our value spaces match a
hypothetical conﬁguration of Schwartz’s model using
Procrustes rotation, results showed signiﬁcant congruence
across all studies. Also, across two cultures (the UK and
Brazil), we obtained a two-dimensional spatial arrangement
that resembled the Schwartz’s model and that accentuate
the assumptions of synergies and conﬂict between the
values. These consistent ﬁndings indicate that conceptual
representations of the values within Schwartz’s (1992) model
align with the past evidence of their motivational intercon-
nections, suggesting deep underlying connections between
the two.
It is important to highlight that our research utilized a
range of methods to directly map the meaning of values.
When making similarity judgments, people are required to
think beyond the motivational importance of each value
and to explicitly compare their understanding of the meaning
of the values. We asked participants to make explicit
Figure 11. Value positions according to participants’ value importance ratings (Study 7). [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Mapping human values 47
© 2018 The Authors. European Journal of Personality published by
John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Personality Psychology
Eur. J. Pers. 33: 34–51 (2019)
comparisons at different levels (values, value types, and
value dimensions), to group values according to their under-
standing, or to freely position the values across a spatial
plane. Thus, we were able to introduce different judgmental
reference points, which is important for diverse social con-
structs. For instance, many decades ago, Asch (1946) ob-
served how social traits like ‘cold’ could take on new
meaning depending on the traits presented alongside them.
Also, when presenting different and new stimuli to individ-
uals, concepts are triggered in memory, allowing people to
draw conclusions about similarity between the items (Medin
& Schaffer, 1978; Minda & Smith, 2001; Murphy, 2004).
This concept mapping exercise explicitly builds these
shifting perspectives into the derivation of the conceptual
model.
Cross-cultural comparisons: Importance
ratings × similarities
Although we replicated Schwartz’s structure across a range
of methods, there are some differences between our ﬁndings
and previous research that investigated value structure in the
UK and in Brazil. In the UK, using importance ratings, the
quasi-circumplex structure was consistently replicated across
three samples, without deviations (Bilski et al., 2011). For
Brazil, previous research showed only minor deviations
(value types merging or swapping positions; Sambiase
et al., 2010; Tamayo & Porto, 2009; Tamayo & Schwartz,
1993). The structure was similar in most of our studies, with
the two opposing bipolar dimensions clearly arising. How-
ever, some structural differences were found. For instance,
in our Study 2, the self-transcendence value types emerged
closer to each other than the value types of the other higher
order values. This is in line with previous ﬁndings based on
importance ratings, which also found that universalism and
benevolence tended to occupy the same region (e.g.
Sambiase et al., 2010; Tamayo & Porto, 2009). Also, in
Study 4, self-enhancement and openness values were more
tightly clustered than the other two higher order values. This
ﬁnding might indicate that self-enhancement and openness
values are composed by less diverse concepts. Indeed, Study
6 found that self-enhancement and openness values were
mixed together, opposing the self-transcendence and conser-
vation values, which were also intermixed. In this case, the
structure indicated an organization based on the personal
and social focus of the values. Together, these comparisons
show that the conceptual clustering of values can differ from
their motivational clustering, despite broad alignments be-
tween the conceptual and motivational structure of values.
Deviations
Notwithstanding the support for the quasi-circumplex struc-
ture across the seven studies, we also observed small devia-
tions that warrant consideration. For example, some values
swapped positions with adjacent values (Studies 1, 2, and
3), some values clustered more than others (Study 4), some
were grouped based on their focus (personal and social;
Study 6), and some values were categorized differently in
different nations (Study 5). These swapping and ﬂuctuations
in values positions have also been shown in previous re-
search that assessed the quasi-circumplex structure (e.g.
Bilsky et al., 2011; Fontaine et al., 2008; Schwartz et al.,
2012; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). For example, in the UK
sample of Study 5, six of the eight values positioned in the
unexpected end of the dimension are known for their incon-
sistency across cultures (Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). Nonethe-
less, it is worth emphasizing that our designs are better suited
to drawing conclusions about the broad patterns of relations
between values than about speciﬁc deviations, because we
would need larger samples to provide powerful conclusions
about the reliability of speciﬁc deviations. In this respect,
the consistency of support for the circular model across all
seven studies is more noteworthy.
It may nevertheless be useful to consider whether there
are patterns in deviations that reﬂect inherent properties of
the values. Consider the ﬁndings in Study 5. In the British
sample, six self-transcendence values were positioned closer
to the opposite end of the dimension. Speciﬁcally, inner har-
mony, meaning in life, mature love, wisdom, true friendship,
and a spiritual life appeared in the self-enhancement side,
even though the last value was next to the centre of the scale.
In the Brazilian sample, there were similar deviations for two
self-transcendence values, and ﬁve conservation values
(healthy, humble, reciprocation of favors, politeness, and
sense of belonging) were found in the wrong end of the
conservation-to-openness dimension. These exceptions
might have been more evident in Study 5 because of the
way the task was structured. Whereas Studies 1 to 4 asked
participants to rate similarities between the items, Study 5
asked participants to place the values inside the two-
dimensional space proposed by Schwartz. By asking partici-
pants to make a choice inside the two dimensions, they might
have been more likely to notice instances where the values
can serve varied motives. In this respect, it is interesting that
the six self-transcendence values may be relatively broad,
inward facing, and focused on balance (e.g. inner harmony,
true friendship, meaning in life, mature love, wisdom, and
a spiritual life) compared with other self-transcendence
values, such as equality, honesty, forgiving, and loyalty.
The relative focus on inward insight and balance may help
to explain their ﬂexibility in motivational construals. For ex-
ample, wisdom can be useful for one’s own career. Similarly,
the conservation values that deviated in the Brazilian sample
may be relatively broad, indicating personal characteristics
that are considered important to individuals, especially when
compared with more concrete values from this higher order
value (e.g. family security, national security, social order,
and respect for tradition). Despite being exceptions and not
the rule, these values reveal interesting ways in which partic-
ular values may readily encompass behaviours that simulta-
neously map onto opposing values.
Limitations and future directions
Although some of our samples were skewed towards
women, research has shown across cultures that both men
and women perceive the values in the same way, reproducing
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the quasi-circumplex model and its ideas of congruence and
conﬂict of values (Struch, Schwartz, & Kloot, 2002). Fur-
thermore, three of our studies (4, 6, and 7) recruited from
more general populations with more gender balance in the
samples, and they revealed no noteworthy differences from
our other results.
Overall, the multiple structure assessment methods used
across our studies indicate that the conceptual interrelations
between values and the motivational interrelations currently
embodied in Schwartz’s model are closely aligned. We rec-
ognize the importance of motivational relations between
values and their role in understanding relations between
values and other psychological variables (e.g. political atti-
tudes and personality traits; Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna,
Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006; Parks-Leduc, Feldman,
& Bardi, 2015). For instance, why would universalism and
benevolence both positively predict altruism when they
are only conceptually similar (Hanel, Litzellachner, &
Maio, 2018)? We expect that they both predict altruism be-
cause of similar underlying motivation. Also, as can be seen
in Study 7, results indicate a correlation (using Procrustes
rotation) between the distributions provided through similar-
ity judgments and importance ratings. Thus, our ﬁndings do
not undermine the importance of the motivational interrela-
tions. Instead, they show for the ﬁrst time that the concep-
tual and motivational aspects of value interrelations are
both distinct and convergent.
The variability in conceptual locations of values across
methods and cultures provides clues about their potential
for variation in application to attitudes and behaviours.
Knowing how similar values are to each other might help
to delineate future studies that focus on understanding their
predictive power. This has been a difﬁcult task so far,
because any particular attitude or behaviour can express
different values at time (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz,
1996). For instance, one might think of inﬂuential, a self-
enhancement value, as relevant to some self-transcendence
values (e.g. protecting the environment and equality), be-
cause the values may be interconnected in real-world con-
texts (e.g. using one’s inﬂuence to promote recycling and
making public speeches to end the gender pay gap). There-
fore, the investigation of these mental representations can
help us not only to better understand the value relations
based on their content, but also their association to attitude
and behaviour in the real world.
Also, assessing values through their conceptual represen-
tations can aid theory development. Because people under-
stand and interpret values in different ways, based on their
personal categorizations, our research might also help to
identify values that are less or more variable in representation
across methods or countries. In fact, the methodology can be
applied not only using Schwartz’s value model but also other
(circumplex) models, such as the circumplex model of goal
content (Grouzet et al., 2005), the interpersonal circumplex
(Wiggins & Pincus, 1989), or the circumplex model of affect
(Posner, Russell, & Peterson, 2005). It might also lead to the
identiﬁcation of a new dimension, as previously done by
Koch, Alves, et al. (2016), who modiﬁed the stereotype con-
tent model also using SpAM.
Conclusion
The motivational aspects of human values are central to
understanding their implications, but conceptual representa-
tions of values are equally fundamental. The present research
addresses a longstanding deﬁcit in our knowledge of the con-
ceptual representation of values. By examining how these
values are organized as concepts, we learned about how peo-
ple categorize and interpret values. This novel analysis found
that the conceptual links between values are broadly consis-
tent with the motivational relations predicted by Schwartz’s
model, alongside small differences that warrant further
investigation.
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